Circumstances Did Not Warrant Interlocutory Appeal of Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Its Own Complaint as Lacking Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Mata v. Eclipse Aerospace, Inc. & Production Line Group v. Eclipse Aerospace, Inc. (In re AE Liquidation, Inc.), Case No. 08-13031 (MFW), Adv. Pro. No. 08-51891 (MFW), Misc. No. 10-193-LPS (May 10, 2011) (J. Stark)

On August 4, 2010, the Bankruptcy Court denied plaintiff Production Line Group’s (the “Plaintiff” or the “PLG”) motion to dismiss its own complaint as lacking subject matter jurisdiction. The issues set forth in the Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss centered around a dispute concerning the status of certain aircraft which members of the Plaintiff’s constituency had purchased from the Debtor prior to the bankruptcy filing, and the ownership of which had yet to be determined. Although the PLG had entered into purchase agreements for the aircraft and made substantial down payments (typically 60% of the purchase price), there was some question as to whether the airplanes were property of the estate.

During the course of the bankruptcy (which was filed under chapter 11 and subsequently converted to chapter 7), a sale of substantially all of the Debtor’s assets was consummated, subject to the PLG’s rights in the airplanes. Thereafter, the PLG moved to dismiss the adversary proceeding it had filed in the bankruptcy case, claiming the Bankruptcy Court no longer had jurisdiction to determine the ownership of the airplanes. Post-sale, the PLG argued, the airplanes were either owned by the PLG or by Eclipse Aerospace, Inc., the purchaser of the Debtor’s assets, both of which were non-debtor parties. 

The Bankruptcy Court denied the motion, concluding that it had exclusive jurisdiction over at least one of the questions raised in the PLG complaint – namely, whether the airplanes constituted property of the estate prior to the sale. The PLG filed a motion for leave to appeal the Bankruptcy Court’s order, which the District Court denied for the reasons set forth below.

Discussion:

The District Court concluded that none of the three factors favoring interlocutory appeal were present, nor had the Plaintiffs presented any rationale which might persuade the Court to entertain the interlocutory appeal, and, accordingly, denied the motion for leave to appeal. Though the Bankruptcy Code does not identify the standard district courts should use in deciding whether to grant an interlocutory appeal, district courts typically follow the standards set forth under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), which govern interlocutory appeals from a district court to a court of appeals. 

Under the § 1292(b) standards, an interlocutory appeal is “permitted only when the order at issue (1) involves a controlling question of law upon which there is (2) substantial grounds for a difference of opinion as to its correctness, and (3) if appealed immediately, may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” At 5.

First, the District Court found that first factor did not favor the interlocutory appeal because the issue did not involve a controlling question of law, but rather was inextricably fact-based as it centered around “whether the property is or is not bankruptcy estate property…the very question presented by the Adversary Proceeding.” At 6.

Second, the District Court waived off the Plaintiffs’ concerns as mere disagreement with the Bankruptcy Court’s conclusions, which “does not create a substantial ground for difference of opinion.” At 8.

Finally, rather than materially advance the litigation towards termination, the District Court concluded that an interlocutory appeal would “only promote piecemeal determination of the questions raised in the adversary action and would likely create unnecessary delay.” At 9. Without any "circumstance or reason that distinguishes the case from the procedural norm and establishes the need for immediate review,” the case did not warrant interlocutory appeal and the District Court denied the Plaintiffs’ motion for same.

Court Held That Post-Confirmation Suit for Breach of Two Reinsurance Agreements and Bad faith Refusal to Pay Claims Was Non-Core

 Logan v. Westchester Fire Insurance Company (In re PRS Insurance Group, Inc.), Case No. 00-4070 (MFW), Adv. Pro. No. 11-50467 (MFW) (March 30, 2011) (J. Walrath)

PRS Insurance Group, Inc. (“PRS”), along with certain of its subsidiaries, commenced cases under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code on January 19, 2001. Sean C. Logan serves as Trustee in the cases and, subsequent to the initial filing, the Trustee commenced chapter 11 cases on behalf of certain off-shore affiliates of PRS, including Enterprise Group Insurance Company Ltd. (“EGIC”). On March 2, 2007, the Court entered an order confirming the Joint Debtors’ Plan of Liquidation, which became effective on August 24, 2007.

On March 16, 2010, the Trustee, on behalf of EGIC, filed suit in the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio against Westchester Fire Insurance Company and ACE INA Holdings, Inc. (the “Defendants”) for breach of two reinsurance agreements and bad faith refusal to pay claims. The action was transferred to the District Court for the District of Delaware on October 28, 2010. The Trustee filed a motion to refer the action to the Bankruptcy Court on December 12, 2010, and the District Court granted the Trustee’s request but limited the referral to the determination of whether the action constitutes a core proceeding under the Bankruptcy Code. Though the Trustee asserted that the matter was a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(E) because it is an “[order] to turn over property of the estate,” the Bankruptcy Court agreed with the Defendants that the matter was non-core.

Discussion:

Bankruptcy court jurisdiction is divided into “core” and “non-core” jurisdiction. Cases under title 11, proceedings arising under title 11, and proceedings arising in a case under title 11 are core proceedings. However, proceedings that are merely “related to” a case under title 11 are non-core. The Defendants argued, and the Court agreed, that the proceeding at bar was not within the Court’s jurisdiction “under” title 11 or “arising under” title 11 as the action was separate from the bankruptcy petitions and did not involve any steps in the bankruptcy cases.

Defendants further argued, and the Court again agreed, that the cause of action did not fall within the Court’s “arising in” jurisdiction, citing numerous courts that had held that an action by a debtor or trustee against the debtor’s insurer is a non-core proceeding. See, e.g., In re United States Brass Corp., 110 F.3d 1261, 1268 (7th Cir. 1997); Allied Prod. Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2596, *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 24, 2003); In re Ramex Int’l, Inc., 91 B.R. 313, 315 (E.D. Pa. 1988); G-1 Holdings, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. (In re G-1 Holdings, Inc.), 278 B.R. 376, 380 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2002). Reasoning that the action was for breach of two reinsurance agreements and bad faith refusal to pay claims – neither of which involved a dispute that could arise only in the context of a bankruptcy case – the Court declined to find core jurisdiction.

Finally, the Court was unpersuaded by the Trustee’s argument that the action may impact the size of the liquidating trust and remarked that “the Court may not even have ‘related to’ jurisdiction over the Trustee’s action” because “a court may only exercise jurisdiction [post-confirmation] where a claim has ‘a close nexus to the bankruptcy plan or proceeding’ and the matter at issue ‘affects the interpretation, implementation, consummation, execution, or administration of a confirmed plan or incorporated litigation trust agreement.’” “The mere potential to increase the assets of a post-confirmation trust is insufficient to establish the required ‘close nexus.’”

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the Court held that the proceeding was non-core.

Finish Him! Bankruptcy Court Dismissed Suit Over Mortal Kombat Intellectual Property Rights For Lack Of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

 In re: Midway Games Inc., Case No. 09-10465 (KG); Threshold Entertainment, Inc. v. Midway Games Inc., et al., Adv. Case No. 09-51081 (KG)(March 29, 2011) (J. Gross)

Following their bankruptcy, Midway Games Inc. and its affiliated debtors (the “Debtors” or “Midway”) sold their assets to Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. (“WBEI”). Threshold Entertainment, Inc. (“Threshold” or “Plaintiff”) initiated an adversary proceeding (the “Adversary”) against the Debtors and sought declaratory relief with respect to certain license and intellectual property rights (the “Intellectual Property Claims”) relating to Midway’s series of Mortal Kombat videogames. Threshold also objected (the “Objection”) to the asset sale (the “Sale”) to WBEI and the parties agreed to resolve the Objection by including language in the Sale Order that made the purchase subject to Threshold’s Intellectual Property Claims, if any. The Court entered the Sale Order on July 1, 2009.

Relating to the Adversary, the Court was asked to rule on Threshold’s motions to: (1) substitute WBEI as a defendant pursuant to Rule 25 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 2) transfer the Adversary to the District Court for the Central District of California. WBEI, in turn, argued that the Delaware Bankruptcy Court (the “Court”) lacked subject matter jurisdiction over these matters because the Sale relieved the Debtors of any interest in the outcome of the Adversary or Mortal Kombat. As discussed below, the Court found that it lacked jurisdiction over the Adversary, denied Threshold’s motions and dismissed the Adversary.

Discussion:

The Court dismissed the Adversary finding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the Adversary. With respect to non-core proceedings, the Court noted, a bankruptcy court will have jurisdiction over such matters only if they are sufficiently “related to” the bankruptcy estate.  See Binder v. Price Waterhouse & Co., LLP (In re Resorts Int’l, Inc.) 372 F.3d 154, 162 (3d Cir. 2004) (bankruptcy court jurisdiction potentially extends to four types of title 11 matters). Quoting Pacor Inc. v. Higgins, (In re Pacor), 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984) the Court set forth the test for “related to” jurisdiction, which is “whether the outcome of [a] proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy.” Because the Intellectual Property Claims could have no conceivable effect on the bankruptcy estate, the Court, therefore, declined to retain jurisdiction of the Adversary. The Court reasoned that the dispute was between two related third parties – Threshold and WBEI, and the property, Mortal Kombat, was sold and therefore, was no longer part of the estate. The dispute did not concern the terms of the Sale or anything that may have placed the Debtors’ estate at risk. As such, the Court dismissed the Adversary and denied Threshold’s motions.