Circumstances Did Not Warrant Interlocutory Appeal of Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Its Own Complaint as Lacking Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Mata v. Eclipse Aerospace, Inc. & Production Line Group v. Eclipse Aerospace, Inc. (In re AE Liquidation, Inc.), Case No. 08-13031 (MFW), Adv. Pro. No. 08-51891 (MFW), Misc. No. 10-193-LPS (May 10, 2011) (J. Stark)

On August 4, 2010, the Bankruptcy Court denied plaintiff Production Line Group’s (the “Plaintiff” or the “PLG”) motion to dismiss its own complaint as lacking subject matter jurisdiction. The issues set forth in the Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss centered around a dispute concerning the status of certain aircraft which members of the Plaintiff’s constituency had purchased from the Debtor prior to the bankruptcy filing, and the ownership of which had yet to be determined. Although the PLG had entered into purchase agreements for the aircraft and made substantial down payments (typically 60% of the purchase price), there was some question as to whether the airplanes were property of the estate.

During the course of the bankruptcy (which was filed under chapter 11 and subsequently converted to chapter 7), a sale of substantially all of the Debtor’s assets was consummated, subject to the PLG’s rights in the airplanes. Thereafter, the PLG moved to dismiss the adversary proceeding it had filed in the bankruptcy case, claiming the Bankruptcy Court no longer had jurisdiction to determine the ownership of the airplanes. Post-sale, the PLG argued, the airplanes were either owned by the PLG or by Eclipse Aerospace, Inc., the purchaser of the Debtor’s assets, both of which were non-debtor parties. 

The Bankruptcy Court denied the motion, concluding that it had exclusive jurisdiction over at least one of the questions raised in the PLG complaint – namely, whether the airplanes constituted property of the estate prior to the sale. The PLG filed a motion for leave to appeal the Bankruptcy Court’s order, which the District Court denied for the reasons set forth below.

Discussion:

The District Court concluded that none of the three factors favoring interlocutory appeal were present, nor had the Plaintiffs presented any rationale which might persuade the Court to entertain the interlocutory appeal, and, accordingly, denied the motion for leave to appeal. Though the Bankruptcy Code does not identify the standard district courts should use in deciding whether to grant an interlocutory appeal, district courts typically follow the standards set forth under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), which govern interlocutory appeals from a district court to a court of appeals. 

Under the § 1292(b) standards, an interlocutory appeal is “permitted only when the order at issue (1) involves a controlling question of law upon which there is (2) substantial grounds for a difference of opinion as to its correctness, and (3) if appealed immediately, may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” At 5.

First, the District Court found that first factor did not favor the interlocutory appeal because the issue did not involve a controlling question of law, but rather was inextricably fact-based as it centered around “whether the property is or is not bankruptcy estate property…the very question presented by the Adversary Proceeding.” At 6.

Second, the District Court waived off the Plaintiffs’ concerns as mere disagreement with the Bankruptcy Court’s conclusions, which “does not create a substantial ground for difference of opinion.” At 8.

Finally, rather than materially advance the litigation towards termination, the District Court concluded that an interlocutory appeal would “only promote piecemeal determination of the questions raised in the adversary action and would likely create unnecessary delay.” At 9. Without any "circumstance or reason that distinguishes the case from the procedural norm and establishes the need for immediate review,” the case did not warrant interlocutory appeal and the District Court denied the Plaintiffs’ motion for same.

District Court Affirms That Mutuality Requirement For Setoff Under 11 U.S.C. § 553 Cannot Be Supplied By A Multi-Party Agreement Contemplating A Triangular Setoff

Chevron Prods. Co. v. SemCrude, L.P., Case No. 08-11525 (BLS), C.A. No. 09-288 (JJF) (April 30, 2010) (J. Farnan)

Chevron Products Company (“Chevron”) sought relief from the automatic stay (the “Motion for Relief From Stay”) to exercise its contractual right to setoff against certain claims and debts with SemCrude, L.P., SemFuel, L.P., and SemStream, L.P. (collectively the “Debtors”).  On January 9, 2009, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (“Bankruptcy Court”), in an order by Judge Shannon, denied the relief sought, holding that no exception to the “mutuality” requirement under § 553 applied.  Chevron filed a motion for reconsideration (the “Motion for Reconsideration”), raising for the first time the safe harbor protections provided under 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(6), (17), (27), 556, 560, and 561.  On March 19, 2009, the Court denied Chevron’s Motion for Reconsideration

On Appeal, the District Court held that the Bankruptcy Court correctly denied both the Motion for Relief From Stay and the Motion for Reconsideration.

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Third Circuit (Again) Reaffirms Pacor Test for 'Related-To' Jurisdiction and Denies Extension of Section 105(a) Stay

W.R. Grace & Co. v. Chakarian, Nos. 3697/3720, 2009 WL 5151089 (3d. Cir. Dec. 31, 2009)

In this joint appeal from decisions of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware and the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, the debtor, W.R. Grace & Co. (“Grace”) appealed an order denying expansion of an injunction under Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code to bar claims brought by claimants (the “Libby Claimants”) against the State of Montana, alleged to arise out of Grace’s operation of a vermiculite mine near Libby, Montana.

On December 31, 2009, the Third Circuit affirmed the Bankruptcy Court and District Court’s refusal to extend the stay to the claims of the Libby Claimants against the State of Montana. In doing so, the Third Circuit found that the Bankruptcy Court properly determined that it did not have “related-to” jurisdiction over the claims.

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Third Circuit Denies Debtors' Appeal from Order Denying Request for Hearing on Chapter 7 Trustee's Eligibility to Serve, Finding That Order Was Not Final and Jurisdiction Was Therefore Lacking

In re Truong, 513 F.3d 91 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (Precedential)

The debtors in this Chapter 7 case filed a motion in the Bankruptcy Court to hold a hearing on whether the Chapter 7 Trustee should be removed under 11 U.S.C. § 324 (a) because of a conflict of interest. The Bankruptcy Court denied the motion, and the District Court dismissed the debtors’ appeal. The Third Circuit held that the appeal was from an interlocutory appeal, and that it therefore lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d).

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Third Circuit Affirms Order of District Court for Western District of Pennsylvania and Holds That Insurers Were Not "Persons Aggrieved" by Pittsburgh Corning Rule 2019 Order

In re Pittsburgh Corning Corp., No. 05-4781 (3d Cir. Jan. 10, 2008) (Rendell, J.)

Various insurers appealed from a district court order affirming a bankruptcy court order setting procedures for the filing of statements under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2019.  In a non-precedential opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the insurers were not “person aggrieved,” and therefore lacked bankruptcy appellate standing. Continue Reading...

Third Circuit Publishes Significant Opinion on Bankruptcy Jurisdiction, Holds That When a Court Possesses "Arising In" Jurisdiction, "Close Nexus" Test Does Not Apply

In re Seven Fields Dev. Corp., 505 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2007) (Circuit Judge Morton I. Greenberg)

Creditors of the debtor, Seven Fields Development Corporation, brought an action against an accounting firm employed by the debtor for alleged misconduct occurring during the debtor’s Chapter 11 case, but prior to plan confirmation. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found the claims arose in bankruptcy, and the action therefore was a core proceeding. Because the Bankruptcy Court possessed “arising in” jurisdiction, there was no need for the Bankruptcy Court to determine whether the action had a “close nexus” to the bankruptcy case. In dicta, the Third Circuit also decided that when a federal court exercises “related to” jurisdiction, the Court is required to determine whether there is a “close nexus” between the claims asserted and the bankruptcy cases, such determination to be made as of the time that the claims are brought.

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Third Circuit Holds Bankruptcy Court's Interpretation of Own Order To Be Reviewed Under Abuse of Discretion Standard

In re Shenango Group Inc., 501 F.3d 338 (3d Cir. Sept. 6, 2007) (Circuit Judge D. Brooks Smith)

In this precedential opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in a case of first impression, adopted a standard for reviewing a bankruptcy court’s interpretation of its own order. If the appeal concerns a bankruptcy court’s interpretation its own order, the Court held that an abuse of discretion standard should be applied. If the issue under review presents only a question of law, that review will be de novo.

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Bankruptcy Court Grants Limited Stay of Proceeding Pending District Court's Decision on Defendants' Request for Interlocutory Appeal

Haskell v. Goldman, Sachs & Co. (In re Genesis Health Ventures, Inc.), 367 B.R. 516 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007) (Judge Peter J. Walsh)

In this adversary proceeding commenced by investors in reorganized debtor Genesis Health Ventures, the non-debtor defendants requested leave of the United States District Court for the District of Delaware to take an interlocutory appeal from a decision of the Bankruptcy Court denying the defendants, who were senior secured debt holders, the protections of 11 U.S.C. § 1144. The defendants moved for a stay of proceedings pending the district court’s decision. The bankruptcy court granted a limited stay of the proceedings, balancing the need to move forward with the possibility that the request may remain before the district court for an extended period without being decided.

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The End of the Road for Eastern Airlines Pilots? Third Circuit Blocks Pilots Groups' Efforts to Force Continental Airlines Pilots to Arbitrate Claims Discharged in Continental Bankruptcy

Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. Eastern Pilots Merger Comm. (In re Cont’l Airlines, Inc.), 484 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2007) (Circuit Judge Julio M. Fuentes)

In their third visit to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, a group of former pilots of Eastern Airlines appealed from a decision of the United States District Court for the District of Delaware enjoining them from proceeding to arbitration with debtor Continental Airlines and its pilots. Because the Eastern pilots sought arbitration under their former collective bargaining agreement (the “CBA”) with Eastern Airlines (which became an obligation of Continental Airlines when it merged with Eastern), and the debtors’ obligations under the CBA had been discharged, the debtors would not be compelled to appear at an arbitration in which no award against them would be possible. The Continental pilots were not a party to the CBA, and could not be bound by its arbitration provision.

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Bankruptcy Court Declines to Grant Request for Certification of Appeal Directly to Third Circuit; Defers to District Court's Consideration of Motion for Leave to Appeal

Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Advanced Marketing Servs. Inc. (In re Advanced Marketing Servs. Inc.), 366 B.R. 429 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007) (Judge Christopher S. Sontchi)

Simon & Schuster, a creditor of debtor Advanced Marketing Services, Inc., filed a reclamation claim against the debtor, and sought to have a temporary restraining order put in place to prevent the debtor from selling the S&S goods that were subject to the reclamation claim. The court denied the motion in a previously reported opinion. (here)

S&S then sought to pursue an appeal of the court’s interlocutory order denying the TRO motion, moved the District Court for leave to appeal, and requested that the Bankruptcy Court certify that the case was suitable for direct appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2). The Bankruptcy Court declined to decide the request, finding that, because the District Court and Bankruptcy Court were being asked to make an almost identical set of findings, judicial resources would best be used by deferring to the District Court to decide the motion for leave to appeal. Moreover, respect for the hierarchy of the courts warranted deference to the District Court.

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District Court Dismisses Appeal As Untimely Under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a) Where Appellant Filed Notice Of Appeal Fifteen Calendar Days After Date Of Entry Of Order

Hayes v. Genesis Health Ventures, Inc. (In re Genesis Health Ventures, Inc.), Civ. A. No. 06-397 (JJF), Case No. 00-2692 (PJW), 2007 WL 211209 (D. Del. Jan. 26, 2007) (Judge Joseph J. Farnan, Jr.)

The appellant filed a notice of appeal from an order of the Bankruptcy Court imposing sanctions against the appellant. However, although the notice of appeal was dated eight days after the date of entry of the order, it was not filed until fifteen days after the date of entry of the order appealed from. Because the ten day deadline to file a notice of appeal under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8002(a) was jurisdictional, the District Court found that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the appeal.

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Entry Of Final Judgment Denied Where Summary Judgment Only Granted Partial Relief

Fluor Enters. Corp. v. Orion Refining Corp. (In re Orion Refining Corp.), 355 B.R. 433 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (Judge Mary F. Walrath)

The Court granted summary judgment as to two counts of a four count complaint. Because each count sought relief under a common set of operative facts, the Court did not exercise its discretion to enter final judgment on each of the two counts as to which it entered summary judgment.

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