Delaware Business Bankruptcy Report : Delaware Business Bankruptcy Report : Morris James LLP Lawyers & Attorneys

Wahoski v. Classic Packaging Co. (In re Pillowtex Corp.), Adv. Pro. No. 05-30182 (KJC) (April 14, 2010) (J. Carey)

John Wahoski, as liquidating trustee of Pillowtex Corporation (the “Liquidating Trustee”) sought to recover $61,761.32 in allegedly preferential payments (the “Transfers”) from Classic Packaging Company (“Classic”), which had sold plastic bags and packaging printed with the Pillowtex brand names to the Debtors prior to the petition date.  The Liquidating Trustee was also pursuing a claim to recover allegedly fraudulent transfers. 

Classic filed a motion for summary judgment with regard to the Transfers, arguing that the ordinary course of business defense applied to each Transfer and a motion to dismiss arguing that the complaint did not set forth fraudulent transfer claims with sufficient specificity.  For the reasons articulated below, the Court denied the motion for summary judgment and granted the motion to dismiss.

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Official Unsecured Creditors’ Committee of Broadstripe, LLC v. Capital Management, L.P. (In re Broadstripe, LLC), Case No. 09-10006 (CSS), Adv. No. 09-50966 (CSS) (September 2, 2010) (J. Sontchi)

On January 2, 2009 (the “Petition Date”), Broadstripe commenced its Chapter 11 cases by filing voluntary petitions for relief.  Sometime thereafter, the Official Unsecured Creditors’ Committee (“OUCC”) filed the instant Complaint in which it sought relief from Highland Capital (“Highland”) under twelve theories.  The Complaint centered around two events: (1) Highland’s objection to the Wave Sale, pursuant to which WaveDivision Holdings, LLC (“Wave”) committed to purchase two of Broadstripe’s three systems for $157 million; and (2) Highland’s alleged representation that it would finance the James Cable Asset Purchase Agreement (the “James Cable APA”) – pursuant to which Broadstripe, which represented in the James Cable APA that it had the financial capacity to consummate the sale, would purchase substantially all of James Cable’s assets for a purchase price to be determined later – and its subsequent refusal and failure to do so.

On September 2, 2010, the Court issued a memorandum opinion containing its findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to its May 3, 2010 order denying Highland’s motion for summary judgment as to Counts One (recharacterization), Two (equitable subordination), Four (breach of duty of care), Five (breach of duty of loyalty), Six (aiding and abetting breach of duty of care), Seven (aiding and abetting breach of duty of loyalty), Eight (preference claims related to First Liens), Nine (preference claims related to Second Liens), Eleven (recovery of avoidance actions), and Twelve (disallowance of Highland’s claims pursuant to § 502(d)) and granting the motion with respect to Count Three (alter ego). 

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Mervyn’s LLC v. Lubert-Adler Group IV, LLC (In re Mervyn’s Holdings, LLC), Adv. Pro. No. 08-51402 (KG) (March 12, 2010) (K. Gross).

The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the “Committee”) asserted a subsequent transferee claim pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(2) against Bank of America (in its capacity as successor trustee of a trust) to recover certain liens granted to the former trustee on transferred real estate. Due to numerous omissions in the original Complaint, which Bank of America addressed in a timely filed motion to dismiss, the Committee sought to amend its Complaint. Bank of America opposed the amendments, arguing that they would prove futile because Bank of America was not a “transferee” for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 550.

The Court agreed with Bank of America, denying the Committee’s Motion to Amend as futile and granting Bank of America’s Motion to Dismiss.

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Claybrook v. Metro Auto Xpress, LLC (In re American Remanufacturers, Inc.), Case No. 05-20022, 2008 WL 2909871 (Bankr. D. Del. July 25, 2008) (Walsh, J.)

In this Chapter 7 case, the American Remanufacturers, Inc.’s (the “Debtors”) business involved remanufacturing automobile parts for resale. Prior to and after the bankruptcy, the Tri-City purchased automotive parts produced by the Debtors and received credits for used parts it sold to the Debtors. The Chapter 7 Trustee commenced an adversary proceeding against Metro Auto Xpress trading as Tri-City Automotive Warehouse (“Tri-City”) alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and avoidance and turnover of estate property.  The Bankruptcy Court granted Tri-City’s motion to dismiss the avoidance and recovery claims.

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Plassein Int’l Corp. v. B.A. Capital Co. LP (In re Plassein Int’l Corp.), No. 03-14489, 2008 WL 2073495 (D. Del. May 15, 2008) (Judge Joseph J. Farnan, Jr.)

The Debtors’ Chapter 7 Trustee (the “Trustee”) commenced an adversary proceeding against B.A. Capital Co. LP alleging that a series of fraudulent transfers rendered the Debtors insolvent or with unreasonably small capital for its businesses. The Bankruptcy Court had dismissed the Complaint because the court concluded (i) the transfers were settlement payments, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) and thus, not subject to avoidance under 11 U.S.C. § 544(b); (ii) the Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because it failed to assert that Plassein or any of the related Debtors made the allegedly fraudulent transfers; and (iii) the allegations within the Complaint could not be collapsed because neither the intent to defraud nor bad faith was alleged. The District Court affirmed.

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MAS Litigation Trust v. Plastech Engineered Prods. (In re Meridian Automotive Sys.-Composite Ops. Inc.), Adv. Pro. No. 07-51196 (KG), 2007 WL 4322527 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 5, 2007) (Judge Kevin Gross)

Plastech Engineered Products, Inc., a defendant in an avoidance action commenced by the MAS Litigation Trust, moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s amended complaint on the grounds that, inter alia, the new claims set forth in the amended complaint did not relate back to the original complaint.  In a matter related to one we discussed here last week, The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware granted the motion, finding that the new claims did not seem to arise out of the same transactions described in the original complaint.  However, the Court granted the plaintiff twenty days to amend the complaint, if it could allege facts sufficient to show the additional claims related back to the original ones.

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In re Just for Feet, Inc., 375 B.R. 129 (Bankr D. Del. 2007) (Judge Judith K. Fitzgerald)

In these adversary proceedings in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Charles R. Goldstein, Chapter 7 Trustee of the Estate of Just for Feet, Inc., with respect to the defendants’ ordinary course of business defense under 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2). The Court’s ruling was based on the defendants’ failure to prove the “ordinary business terms” element of the defense. Although the defendants’ produced an affidavit from their president in support of the industry terms prong of the ordinary course of business defense, the Court found the affidavit to be insufficient where it merely stated that the affiant was familiar with industry billing practices and that the transfers in question were made in a fashion consistent with those practices. The affidavit failed to identify what the practices were in the defendants’ industry and what the practices were between the debtor and the defendants.

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Stanziale v. Pepper Hamilton LLP (In re Student Finance Corp.), No. 04-1551 (JJF), 2007 WL 2936195 (D. Del. Oct. 5, 2007) (Judge Joseph J. Farnan, Jr.)

In this adversary proceeding in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, certain defendants moved to strike damages claims alleged by the trustee of the estate of Student Finance Corporation.  The Court granted the motion, finding that the trustee failed to provide fair notice of these damages claims, as required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (made applicable to this adversary proceeding by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7008(a)). 

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Giuliano v. Fairfield Group Health Care Centers Ltd. P'ship (In Re Lexington Healthcare Group, Inc.), 363 B.R. 713 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007) (Judge Mary F. Walrath)

The Chapter 7 Trustee filed a complaint against a nursing home landlord under Section 542 of the bankruptcy code seeking turnover of a $2.2 million security deposit posted by the Debtor’s predecessor. The landlord filed a motion to dismiss under FRBP 12(b)(6) claiming that a turnover action under Section 542 may only be used to obtain property which is undisputedly property of the bankruptcy estate. Noting that the Trustee had not pled an absolute right to the security deposit, and that a genuine dispute existed over rights to it, the Court agreed and dismissed the turnover action.

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In re Am. Pad & Paper Co., 478 F.3d 546 (3d Cir. 2007) (Circuit Judge Dolores Korman Sloviter)

Steven Singer, the Chapter 7 Trustee of American Pad & Paper Co. and its co-debtors, was elected under 11 U.S.C. § 702 more than two years after the entry of the order for relief in the debtors’ cases. Singer was elected subsequent to the appointment of an interim trustee under section 701, who was appointed eleven days before the two-year anniversary of the entry of the order for relief.

Singer thereafter commenced avoidance actions against approximately 150 defendants, many of whom moved to dismiss on the basis that such actions were time-barred by 11 U.S.C. § 546(a), which requires that such avoidance actions by filed by the later of two years after the entry of the order for relief, or one year after the appointment of a trustee under section 702, 1104, 1163, 1202 or 1302, if that appointment occurred before the two years after the entry of the order for relief. The Bankruptcy Court dismissed those actions, and the District Court affirmed. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that under the plain language of the statute, the actions were time-barred.

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Broadway Advisors, LLC v. Hipro Elecs., Inc. (In re Gruppo Antico, Inc.), 359 B.R. 578 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007) (Judge Kevin J. Carey)

Vendor Hipro Electronics, Ltd. of Taiwan sold computer parts to the debtor prior to the commencement of the debtor’s bankruptcy case. However, in the period running up to the petition date, the debtor sent payments for Hipro Taiwan invoices to another Hipro entity, Hipro Electronics, Inc., in Texas. Hipro USA forwarded those checks to Hipro Taiwan, who deposited the checks into their own account. The debtor, however, commenced a preference action against Hipro USA. Hipro USA filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court held that, because Hipro USA never deposited the funds, it was not a transferee of the debtor, and therefore could not be liable for the avoidance of the payments that the debtor sent to Hipro USA.

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Claybrook v. Consolidated Foods, Inc. (In re Bake-Line Group, LLC), 359 B.R. 566 (Bankr D. Del. Feb. 5, 2007) (Judge Peter J. Walsh)

The debtor came into possession of a check made payable to the preference defendant when the postman mistakenly delivered the check to the debtor. The debtor converted the check, depositing it into the debtor’s bank account. The defendant learned of the debtor’s actions, and demanded and received from the debtor a check to cover the funds that the debtor had converted. Days later, the debtor commenced its bankruptcy case.

The plaintiff in this adversary proceeding, the trustee of the debtor’s estate, sued the defendant to recover the payment as a preferential transfer. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, finding that the debtor converted the funds, and never had any interest in them that it could transfer.

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Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of the IT Group, Inc. v. Acres of Diamonds, L.P. (In re the IT Group, Inc.), 359 B.R. 97 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (Judge Mary F. Walrath)

Within a year prior to the petition date of the IT Group, Inc. debtors, defendant Acres of Diamonds L.P. sold to Organic Waste Technologies, Inc. five shares of the common stock of Keystone Recovery, Inc. Organic Waste paid for the shares by making a wire transfer of $575,000 from debtor IT Corporation’s Citibank account. Prior to confirmation of the debtors’ Chapter 11 plan, the debtors commenced a preference action against Acres, seeking to avoid and recover the $575,000 payment. The complaint was thereafter amended to add a fraudulent transfer cause of action, and amended again to drop the preference claim. 

The court granted Acres’ motion for summary judgment, finding that the transfer was a payment for securities, made by a financial institution, and therefore excepted from avoidance under section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code.

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Burtch v. Dent, (In re Circle Y of Yoakum, Tx.), 354 B.R. 349 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (Judge Mary F. Walrath)

The Chapter 7 Trustee of debtor Circle Y’s estate asserted claims under sections 547 and 548 of the Bankruptcy Code relating to payments made to an insider more than one year before the petition date. The Bankruptcy Court held that those claims were time-barred. Also, because the Trustee’s fraudulent transfer claims pled no facts in support of the Trustee’s allegations, but merely recited relevant statutory language, the Bankruptcy Court dismissed those claims for failure to plead fraud with sufficient particularity. However, the Court granted the Chapter 7 Trustee leave to amend to add additional payments where those payments were part of a discernible pattern with payments alleged in the Trustee’s original complaint.

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Astropower Liquidating Trust v. Xantrex Tech (In re Astropower Liquidating Trust), Case No. 04-10322 (MFW), Adv. Pro. No. 05-50867, 2006 WL 2850110 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 2, 2006) (Judge Mary F. Walrath)

Defendants Merrill Lynch Asset Management and Merrill Lynch Investment Managers Limited moved to dismiss a fraudulent transfer complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. Finding that the minimum contacts requirement for personal jurisdiction was not met, the Court dismissed the complaint.

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PCT v. Authentic Specialty Foods, Inc. (In re Fleming Cos., Inc.), 347 B.R. 163 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (Judge Mary F. Walrath)

In this adversary proceeding, after eight months of litigation, the plaintiff sought leave to amend its complaint to add three additional causes of action. The Court found that, where discovery deadlines had not expired and where the plaintiff was willing to allow defendant to take additional discovery, the Court held there was no prejudice to the defendant, no undue delay by plaintiff, and amendment would not be futile and allowed the amendment.

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Golden v. The Guardian (In re Lenox Healthcare, Inc.), 343 B.R. 96 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (Judge Mary F. Walrath)

When Guardian Life Insurance Company of America was sued by the Chapter 11 Trustee for Lenox Healthcare, Inc. for alleged preferential, fraudulent and unauthorized post-petition transfers it received, Guardian moved for summary judgment in part on the basis that the transfers it received were actually deductions taken by Lenox from its employees’ paychecks for the purpose of procuring health benefits. As a result, Guardian argued, the funds received by it were not transfers of the debtor’s interest in property, and therefore were not recoverable as preferences. The Bankruptcy Court (Judge Mary F. Walrath) agreed.

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In re Oakwood Homes Corp., 342 B.R. 59 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (Judge Peter J. Walsh)

Defendants moved to dismiss an adversary complaint seeking recovery of funds related to a surety bond and to a letter of credit.

The Court dismissed the counts in the complaint that sought to recover the letter of credit and the proceeds of the letter of credit as neither was property of the estate. However, the Court denied the motion to dismiss counts which sought to recover for alleged contract breaches between the debtors and the Defendants because the estate had a recognized interest in the contractual and equitable claims of the debtor, which were property of the estate.
The Court also granted leave to amend two fraudulent transfer counts.

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Pension Transfer Corp. v. Beneficiaries Under the Third Amendment to Fruehauf Trailer Corp. Retirement Plan No. 003 (In re Fruehauf Trailer Corp.), 444 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2006) (Circuit Judge Thomas L. Ambro)

The Delaware District Court approved the avoidance of an alleged fraudulent transfer under §548(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code of a surplus from a union pension plan that was used to provide benefits to management through a pre-petition amendment to the debtor’s pension plan.

The pension plan had been amended on September 19, 1996 and the Debtor filed its bankruptcy petition approximately two weeks later.

The District Court found that there was not reasonably equivalent value provided to the Debtor for the loss of the surplus used to provide benefits to management. The Defendants had failed to prove that the plan amendment helped to retain key personnel so that the debtor could sell its assets as a going concern.

On appeal, the Third Circuit concluded that the amendment to the pension plan was fraudulent despite the lack of a precise calculation of the benefits conferred and received by the plaintiff.

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In re Hayes Lemmerz Int'l, Inc. (HLI Creditor Trust v. Metal Techs., Inc., 337 B.R. 49 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (Judge Paul B. Lindsey)

The Court presided over a trial in which only the defendant’s § 547(c)(2)(B) and (C) ordinary course of business defenses were at issue.

The Court found that the payments had been made pursuant to ordinary business terms in the defendant’s industry under pre-BAPCPA §547(c)(2)(C) and read the acceptable range of payment aging broadly.

The Court further found that a creditor who insists on a debtor remaining within credit terms established by the parties can do so without taking subsequent payments out of the ordinary course of business under §547 (c)(2)(B). However, if credit terms are altered, such as when shipment is conditioned on advance payment, the ordinary course defense is defeated.

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Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del. v. Universal Forest Products, Inc. (In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del., Inc.), Case No. 99-02261 (PJW), Adv. Pro. No, 01-3170 (PBL), 2004 WL 3113718 (Bankr. D. Del. December 14, 2004) (Judge Paul B. Lindsey)

The debtor, Hechinger Investment Company, operated a chain of home improvement stores. Defendant Universal Forest Products was a trade creditor of the debtor, supplying treated wood products for sale at the debtor’s stores. The debtor brought a preference action against UFP. UFP filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting various defenses under 11 U.S.C. § 547(c), including, most notably, a subsequent new value defense under section 547(c)(4). The Court distinguished the Third Circuit case of In re New York City Shoes, Inc., 880 F.2d 679 (3d Cir.1989), holding that in a typical running account scenario like this one, there is no requirement in section 547(c) that new value remain unpaid. However, the Court held that summary judgment was premature absent a waiver of the other asserted defenses under section 547(c), or a stipulation by the parties as to the amount in controversy, because a calculation under section 547(c)(4) must be prefaced by a determination of whether the transfers made on account of new value are "otherwise avoidable."

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