Circumstances Did Not Warrant Interlocutory Appeal of Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Its Own Complaint as Lacking Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Mata v. Eclipse Aerospace, Inc. & Production Line Group v. Eclipse Aerospace, Inc. (In re AE Liquidation, Inc.), Case No. 08-13031 (MFW), Adv. Pro. No. 08-51891 (MFW), Misc. No. 10-193-LPS (May 10, 2011) (J. Stark)

On August 4, 2010, the Bankruptcy Court denied plaintiff Production Line Group’s (the “Plaintiff” or the “PLG”) motion to dismiss its own complaint as lacking subject matter jurisdiction. The issues set forth in the Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss centered around a dispute concerning the status of certain aircraft which members of the Plaintiff’s constituency had purchased from the Debtor prior to the bankruptcy filing, and the ownership of which had yet to be determined. Although the PLG had entered into purchase agreements for the aircraft and made substantial down payments (typically 60% of the purchase price), there was some question as to whether the airplanes were property of the estate.

During the course of the bankruptcy (which was filed under chapter 11 and subsequently converted to chapter 7), a sale of substantially all of the Debtor’s assets was consummated, subject to the PLG’s rights in the airplanes. Thereafter, the PLG moved to dismiss the adversary proceeding it had filed in the bankruptcy case, claiming the Bankruptcy Court no longer had jurisdiction to determine the ownership of the airplanes. Post-sale, the PLG argued, the airplanes were either owned by the PLG or by Eclipse Aerospace, Inc., the purchaser of the Debtor’s assets, both of which were non-debtor parties. 

The Bankruptcy Court denied the motion, concluding that it had exclusive jurisdiction over at least one of the questions raised in the PLG complaint – namely, whether the airplanes constituted property of the estate prior to the sale. The PLG filed a motion for leave to appeal the Bankruptcy Court’s order, which the District Court denied for the reasons set forth below.

Discussion:

The District Court concluded that none of the three factors favoring interlocutory appeal were present, nor had the Plaintiffs presented any rationale which might persuade the Court to entertain the interlocutory appeal, and, accordingly, denied the motion for leave to appeal. Though the Bankruptcy Code does not identify the standard district courts should use in deciding whether to grant an interlocutory appeal, district courts typically follow the standards set forth under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), which govern interlocutory appeals from a district court to a court of appeals. 

Under the § 1292(b) standards, an interlocutory appeal is “permitted only when the order at issue (1) involves a controlling question of law upon which there is (2) substantial grounds for a difference of opinion as to its correctness, and (3) if appealed immediately, may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” At 5.

First, the District Court found that first factor did not favor the interlocutory appeal because the issue did not involve a controlling question of law, but rather was inextricably fact-based as it centered around “whether the property is or is not bankruptcy estate property…the very question presented by the Adversary Proceeding.” At 6.

Second, the District Court waived off the Plaintiffs’ concerns as mere disagreement with the Bankruptcy Court’s conclusions, which “does not create a substantial ground for difference of opinion.” At 8.

Finally, rather than materially advance the litigation towards termination, the District Court concluded that an interlocutory appeal would “only promote piecemeal determination of the questions raised in the adversary action and would likely create unnecessary delay.” At 9. Without any "circumstance or reason that distinguishes the case from the procedural norm and establishes the need for immediate review,” the case did not warrant interlocutory appeal and the District Court denied the Plaintiffs’ motion for same.

Court Held That Post-Confirmation Suit for Breach of Two Reinsurance Agreements and Bad faith Refusal to Pay Claims Was Non-Core

 Logan v. Westchester Fire Insurance Company (In re PRS Insurance Group, Inc.), Case No. 00-4070 (MFW), Adv. Pro. No. 11-50467 (MFW) (March 30, 2011) (J. Walrath)

PRS Insurance Group, Inc. (“PRS”), along with certain of its subsidiaries, commenced cases under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code on January 19, 2001. Sean C. Logan serves as Trustee in the cases and, subsequent to the initial filing, the Trustee commenced chapter 11 cases on behalf of certain off-shore affiliates of PRS, including Enterprise Group Insurance Company Ltd. (“EGIC”). On March 2, 2007, the Court entered an order confirming the Joint Debtors’ Plan of Liquidation, which became effective on August 24, 2007.

On March 16, 2010, the Trustee, on behalf of EGIC, filed suit in the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio against Westchester Fire Insurance Company and ACE INA Holdings, Inc. (the “Defendants”) for breach of two reinsurance agreements and bad faith refusal to pay claims. The action was transferred to the District Court for the District of Delaware on October 28, 2010. The Trustee filed a motion to refer the action to the Bankruptcy Court on December 12, 2010, and the District Court granted the Trustee’s request but limited the referral to the determination of whether the action constitutes a core proceeding under the Bankruptcy Code. Though the Trustee asserted that the matter was a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(E) because it is an “[order] to turn over property of the estate,” the Bankruptcy Court agreed with the Defendants that the matter was non-core.

Discussion:

Bankruptcy court jurisdiction is divided into “core” and “non-core” jurisdiction. Cases under title 11, proceedings arising under title 11, and proceedings arising in a case under title 11 are core proceedings. However, proceedings that are merely “related to” a case under title 11 are non-core. The Defendants argued, and the Court agreed, that the proceeding at bar was not within the Court’s jurisdiction “under” title 11 or “arising under” title 11 as the action was separate from the bankruptcy petitions and did not involve any steps in the bankruptcy cases.

Defendants further argued, and the Court again agreed, that the cause of action did not fall within the Court’s “arising in” jurisdiction, citing numerous courts that had held that an action by a debtor or trustee against the debtor’s insurer is a non-core proceeding. See, e.g., In re United States Brass Corp., 110 F.3d 1261, 1268 (7th Cir. 1997); Allied Prod. Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2596, *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 24, 2003); In re Ramex Int’l, Inc., 91 B.R. 313, 315 (E.D. Pa. 1988); G-1 Holdings, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. (In re G-1 Holdings, Inc.), 278 B.R. 376, 380 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2002). Reasoning that the action was for breach of two reinsurance agreements and bad faith refusal to pay claims – neither of which involved a dispute that could arise only in the context of a bankruptcy case – the Court declined to find core jurisdiction.

Finally, the Court was unpersuaded by the Trustee’s argument that the action may impact the size of the liquidating trust and remarked that “the Court may not even have ‘related to’ jurisdiction over the Trustee’s action” because “a court may only exercise jurisdiction [post-confirmation] where a claim has ‘a close nexus to the bankruptcy plan or proceeding’ and the matter at issue ‘affects the interpretation, implementation, consummation, execution, or administration of a confirmed plan or incorporated litigation trust agreement.’” “The mere potential to increase the assets of a post-confirmation trust is insufficient to establish the required ‘close nexus.’”

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the Court held that the proceeding was non-core.

Finish Him! Bankruptcy Court Dismissed Suit Over Mortal Kombat Intellectual Property Rights For Lack Of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

 In re: Midway Games Inc., Case No. 09-10465 (KG); Threshold Entertainment, Inc. v. Midway Games Inc., et al., Adv. Case No. 09-51081 (KG)(March 29, 2011) (J. Gross)

Following their bankruptcy, Midway Games Inc. and its affiliated debtors (the “Debtors” or “Midway”) sold their assets to Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. (“WBEI”). Threshold Entertainment, Inc. (“Threshold” or “Plaintiff”) initiated an adversary proceeding (the “Adversary”) against the Debtors and sought declaratory relief with respect to certain license and intellectual property rights (the “Intellectual Property Claims”) relating to Midway’s series of Mortal Kombat videogames. Threshold also objected (the “Objection”) to the asset sale (the “Sale”) to WBEI and the parties agreed to resolve the Objection by including language in the Sale Order that made the purchase subject to Threshold’s Intellectual Property Claims, if any. The Court entered the Sale Order on July 1, 2009.

Relating to the Adversary, the Court was asked to rule on Threshold’s motions to: (1) substitute WBEI as a defendant pursuant to Rule 25 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 2) transfer the Adversary to the District Court for the Central District of California. WBEI, in turn, argued that the Delaware Bankruptcy Court (the “Court”) lacked subject matter jurisdiction over these matters because the Sale relieved the Debtors of any interest in the outcome of the Adversary or Mortal Kombat. As discussed below, the Court found that it lacked jurisdiction over the Adversary, denied Threshold’s motions and dismissed the Adversary.

Discussion:

The Court dismissed the Adversary finding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the Adversary. With respect to non-core proceedings, the Court noted, a bankruptcy court will have jurisdiction over such matters only if they are sufficiently “related to” the bankruptcy estate.  See Binder v. Price Waterhouse & Co., LLP (In re Resorts Int’l, Inc.) 372 F.3d 154, 162 (3d Cir. 2004) (bankruptcy court jurisdiction potentially extends to four types of title 11 matters). Quoting Pacor Inc. v. Higgins, (In re Pacor), 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984) the Court set forth the test for “related to” jurisdiction, which is “whether the outcome of [a] proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy.” Because the Intellectual Property Claims could have no conceivable effect on the bankruptcy estate, the Court, therefore, declined to retain jurisdiction of the Adversary. The Court reasoned that the dispute was between two related third parties – Threshold and WBEI, and the property, Mortal Kombat, was sold and therefore, was no longer part of the estate. The dispute did not concern the terms of the Sale or anything that may have placed the Debtors’ estate at risk. As such, the Court dismissed the Adversary and denied Threshold’s motions.

Bankruptcy Court Holds That Debtor's Claims Relating To Environmental Clean-Up of Debtor's Property Are Non-Core

In re: NEC Holdings Corp., et al., Chapter 11, Case No. 10-11890 (PJW); NEC Holdings Corp., et al. v. Linde LLC, et al., Adv. Proc. No. 11-51129 (PJW) (J. Walsh) (May 4, 2011, amended May 18, 2011)

The Court was asked to determine whether environmental claims were core or non-core. Debtors commenced an adversary proceeding against Linde LLC and related entities (“Linde”) seeking recovery of costs, contribution and declaratory relief relating to environmental liabilities of real property located at 400 Clermont Terrance in Union, New Jersey.

The Union property is the Debtors sole remaining substantial tangible asset. Linde was the prior owner of the Union property. The Debtors filed an adversary proceeding seeking recovery for costs and contribution and declaratory relief under CERCLA; contribution under the New Jersey Sill Act and contribution under the New Jersey Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law. Debtors assert that the claims are core proceedings under section 157(b)(2)(A) and (O). The Defendants moved for a determination that the claims are non-core.

Discussion:

The Court first looked to the non-exhaustive list of core proceedings in section 157(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. The Court then performed a claim-by-claim two-step test by reviewing whether the claim (1) invokes a substantive right provided by title 11 or (2) is a proceeding, that by its nature, could arise only in the context of a bankruptcy case. See In re Exide Technologies, 544 F.3d 196, 206 (3d Cir. 2008).

The Court did not accept the Debtors’ arguments that these claims were core. Debtors asserted that the claims fall under section 157(b)(2)(A) covering “matters concerning the administration of the estate” or section 157(b)(2)(O) covering “other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate or the adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the equity security holder relationship, except personal injury tort or wrongful death claims.” 

In ruling for Defendants, the Court held that the claims do not involve any substantive rights arising under the Bankruptcy Code. Further, the claims could arise outside of the bankruptcy context. Thus, even if the claims fit into section 157(b)(2)(A) or (O), they did not satisfy the two-step test for core proceedings. 

Permissive Abstention Appropriate Where Claims For Payment Of Outstanding Invoices Centered On Contractual Dispute.

DHP Holdings II Corp. v. Peter Skop Industries, Inc. (DHP Holdings II Corp.), Case No. 08-13422, Adv. No. 09-52811 (August 13, 2010) (J. Walrath)

On December 29, 2008 (the “Petition Date”), DHP Holdings II Corporation and several of its affiliates (collectively, the “Debtors”) filed voluntary petitions for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.  Prior to the Petition Date, PSI purchased several products from the Debtors for which PSI had not remitted payment as of the Petition Date.  The Debtors commenced an adversary proceeding on November 20, 2009 to recover the amounts due under the invoices (a total of $123,261.00) it had submitted to PSI, for turnover of the property pursuant to section 542 of the Bankruptcy Code, for breach of contract, and to disallow any claims of PSI pursuant to section 502(d).

In PSI’s answer, it denies that it owes a debt to the Debtors because, inter alia, the Debtors fraudulently misrepresented their financial condition in order to induce PSI to purchase products, even though the Debtors were aware that they would not be able to satisfy their warranty obligations.  As a result, PSI argues that it possesses setoff and recoupment rights due to known warranty claims, anticipated warranty claims, and tort claims brought by customers who purchased the Debtors’ products from it.  PSI moved for permissive abstention, arguing that the twelve factors to be considered in granting permissive abstention weighed in favor of the Court abstaining.  The Court agreed for the reasons set forth more fully below.

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Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Requires Dismissal Of Complaint For Lack Of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Edwards v. New Century Mortgage Corp., et al. (In re New Century TRS Holdings, Inc.), Adv. Pro. No. 08-50000 (KJC) (February 2, 2010).

On April 2, 2007, New Century Mortgage Corporation and its affiliates (the "Debtors") filed voluntary petitions for relief under chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. On January 3, 2008, Gary Forrest Edwards ("Plaintiff" or "Edwards") commenced an adversary proceeding against the banks, individuals, and Court he held responsible for the foreclosure on his home. Edwards later filed an amended complaint, which contained a litany of requests for relief in connection with the state court mortgage foreclosure action. Various Defendants filed motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applied, and arguing that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

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Third Circuit (Again) Reaffirms Pacor Test for 'Related-To' Jurisdiction and Denies Extension of Section 105(a) Stay

W.R. Grace & Co. v. Chakarian, Nos. 3697/3720, 2009 WL 5151089 (3d. Cir. Dec. 31, 2009)

In this joint appeal from decisions of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware and the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, the debtor, W.R. Grace & Co. (“Grace”) appealed an order denying expansion of an injunction under Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code to bar claims brought by claimants (the “Libby Claimants”) against the State of Montana, alleged to arise out of Grace’s operation of a vermiculite mine near Libby, Montana.

On December 31, 2009, the Third Circuit affirmed the Bankruptcy Court and District Court’s refusal to extend the stay to the claims of the Libby Claimants against the State of Montana. In doing so, the Third Circuit found that the Bankruptcy Court properly determined that it did not have “related-to” jurisdiction over the claims.

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Third Circuit Reverses Bankruptcy Court's Exercise of Jurisdiction Over Non-Debtors

In re Exide Techs., No. 07-2230, __ F.3d __ (3d Cir. Sept. 19, 2008)

The persistent question of when a bankruptcy court can exercise “core” jurisdiction over nondebtor vs. nondebtor disputes received close examination in a precedential opinion issued by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals on September 19, 2008.

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Court Grants Motion to Dismiss Amended Avoidance Complaint, But Grants Plaintiff Leave to Amend

MAS Litigation Trust v. Plastech Engineered Prods. (In re Meridian Automotive Sys.-Composite Ops. Inc.), Adv. Pro. No. 07-51196 (KG), 2007 WL 4322527 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 5, 2007) (Judge Kevin Gross)

Plastech Engineered Products, Inc., a defendant in an avoidance action commenced by the MAS Litigation Trust, moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s amended complaint on the grounds that, inter alia, the new claims set forth in the amended complaint did not relate back to the original complaint.  In a matter related to one we discussed here last week, The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware granted the motion, finding that the new claims did not seem to arise out of the same transactions described in the original complaint.  However, the Court granted the plaintiff twenty days to amend the complaint, if it could allege facts sufficient to show the additional claims related back to the original ones.

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Bankruptcy Court Holds That It Possesses Jurisdiction to Determine Amount of Workers' Compensation Owed By American Airlines to Former TWA Employee

In re TWA Inc. Post Confirmation Estate, No. 01-00056 (PJW), 2007 WL 2757148 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 21, 2007) (Judge Peter J. Walsh)

In this proceeding, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that it possessed subject matter jurisdiction to determine the amount of workers’ compensation benefits owed by American Airlines to a former employee of debtor Trans World Airlines. The matter was a core proceeding because it related to a claim filed against the debtor’s estate, even though the debtor was not liable for the claim. However, because the obligation was one assumed by American Airlines under the terms of the Bankruptcy Court’s order approving the sale of TWA’s assets to American, the Bankruptcy Court was required to interpret its own sale order, and thus this was a core proceeding.

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Third Circuit Publishes Significant Opinion on Bankruptcy Jurisdiction, Holds That When a Court Possesses "Arising In" Jurisdiction, "Close Nexus" Test Does Not Apply

In re Seven Fields Dev. Corp., 505 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2007) (Circuit Judge Morton I. Greenberg)

Creditors of the debtor, Seven Fields Development Corporation, brought an action against an accounting firm employed by the debtor for alleged misconduct occurring during the debtor’s Chapter 11 case, but prior to plan confirmation. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found the claims arose in bankruptcy, and the action therefore was a core proceeding. Because the Bankruptcy Court possessed “arising in” jurisdiction, there was no need for the Bankruptcy Court to determine whether the action had a “close nexus” to the bankruptcy case. In dicta, the Third Circuit also decided that when a federal court exercises “related to” jurisdiction, the Court is required to determine whether there is a “close nexus” between the claims asserted and the bankruptcy cases, such determination to be made as of the time that the claims are brought.

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District Court Denies Motion to Withdraw Reference

OHC Liquidation Trust v. Discovery Re (In re Oakwood Homes Corp.), C.A. No. 06-436-JJF, 2007 WL 2071730 (D. Del. July 17, 2007) (Judge Joseph J. Farnan, Jr.)

The United States District of Delaware denied the motion of defendants Discovery Re and United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company to withdraw the reference in this adversary proceeding commenced by the OHC Liquidation Trust. Pursuant to an order of then District Court Chief Judge Sue L. Robinson, effective October 6, 2001, under 28 U.S.C. §  157(a), all cases in the District of Delaware under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code are automatically referred to the Bankruptcy Court. However, under 28 U.S.C. § 157 a party may seek mandatory or permissive withdrawal of the reference so that the case or proceeding may be heard in the District Court. The defendants in this matter sought withdrawal of the reference on mandatory withdrawal grounds, or, in the alternative, on permissive grounds. The District Court found that mandatory withdrawal was not applicable where, as here, only state law claims were in play, and further found that the factors favoring permissive withdrawal were not satisfied.

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Court Declines to Approve Settlement of Plan Administrator's Objection to Indenture Trustee's Claim for Fees and Expenses, Finding Evidence of Reasonableness of Claim to Be Lacking

In re RNI Wind Down Corp., Case No. 06-10110 (CSS), 2007 WL 949647 (Bankr. D. Del. March 29, 2007) (Judge Christopher S. Sontchi)

The Plan Administrator in the bankruptcy case of RNI Wind Down Corporation and its affiliated debtors objected to a request for payment of fees and expenses pursuant to the debtors’ plan of reorganization by the indenture trustee of pre-petition notes of the debtors. The parties agreed to a settlement and moved for approval of the agreement. The Delaware Bankruptcy Court refused to approve the settlement, finding that the legal invoices and request for fees were so heavily redacted and inspecific as to make it impossible for the court to determine whether they were reasonable, and thus whether the settlement was equitable and fair. The court also determined that the plan did not modify the indenture agreement, which was a pre-petition contract among non-debtors, and that it lacked jurisdiction over claims arising under the indenture.

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Adversary Proceeding Relating to Pre-Petition Insurance Coverage Dispute Was Non-Core Matter

Consolidated SWINC Estate and SWE&C Liquidating Trust v. ACE USA, Inc. (In re Stone & Webster, Inc.), 367 B.R. 523 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007) (Judge Peter J. Walsh)

The liquidating trusts of the Stone & Webster debtors commenced an adversary proceeding against insurers of the debtors in connection with a coverage dispute that had been waged for many years, including well before the petition date. The insurers moved for a determination of the core/non-core status of the adversary proceeding. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware determined that the suit was merely a pre-petition state law breach of contract action over which the court had no jurisdiction under the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 71 (1982).

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Motion to Expand Preliminary Injunction to Include Actions Against State of Montana Denied; State Court Claims Permitted to Proceed Against State Without Debtors Based on Finding of Absence of Related-To Jurisdiction

W.R. Grace & Co. v. Chakarian (In re W.R. Grace & Co.), 366 B.R. 295 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007) (Judge Judith K. Fitzgerald)

In an opinion interpreting the Third Circuit’s Pacor standard for related-to jurisdiction, the Court held that state court actions against the State of Montana in which the W.R. Grace & Co. debtors were named as co-defendants – but which causes of action were enjoined – could proceed to the extent that they sought to establish the liability of the State of Montana. Because Montana would have to bring subsequent claims against the Debtors for indemnity and contribution, the state court actions had no “conceivable” effect on the bankruptcy estate, as contemplated by Pacor, so as to vest the Court with related-to jurisdiction over the claims. The Court therefore denied the Debtors’ motion to expand a preliminary injunction against the suits to the state of Montana.

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Bankruptcy Court Declines to Grant Request for Certification of Appeal Directly to Third Circuit; Defers to District Court's Consideration of Motion for Leave to Appeal

Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Advanced Marketing Servs. Inc. (In re Advanced Marketing Servs. Inc.), 366 B.R. 429 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007) (Judge Christopher S. Sontchi)

Simon & Schuster, a creditor of debtor Advanced Marketing Services, Inc., filed a reclamation claim against the debtor, and sought to have a temporary restraining order put in place to prevent the debtor from selling the S&S goods that were subject to the reclamation claim. The court denied the motion in a previously reported opinion. (here)

S&S then sought to pursue an appeal of the court’s interlocutory order denying the TRO motion, moved the District Court for leave to appeal, and requested that the Bankruptcy Court certify that the case was suitable for direct appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2). The Bankruptcy Court declined to decide the request, finding that, because the District Court and Bankruptcy Court were being asked to make an almost identical set of findings, judicial resources would best be used by deferring to the District Court to decide the motion for leave to appeal. Moreover, respect for the hierarchy of the courts warranted deference to the District Court.

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Motion For Abstention Denied On Grounds Of Judicial Estoppel

Finova Capital Corp. v. Cote (In re Finova Capital Corp.), 358 B.R. 113 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (Judge Peter J. Walsh)

The debtor sued the defendants in Vermont Superior Court for breach of contract. The Superior Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss on the basis of lack of jurisdiction, which, the Superior Court held, was vested with the Bankruptcy Court. The debtor then commenced an adversary proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court asserting the same breach of contact claims. The defendants moved the Bankruptcy Court to abstain, alleging that the Bankruptcy Court lacked personal jurisdiction. The Bankruptcy Court denied the motion on the basis of judicial estoppel.

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Fraudulent Transfer Complaint Dismissed For Lack Of Personal Jurisdiction

Astropower Liquidating Trust v. Xantrex Tech (In re Astropower Liquidating Trust), Case No. 04-10322 (MFW), Adv. Pro. No. 05-50867, 2006 WL 2850110 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 2, 2006) (Judge Mary F. Walrath)

Defendants Merrill Lynch Asset Management and Merrill Lynch Investment Managers Limited moved to dismiss a fraudulent transfer complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. Finding that the minimum contacts requirement for personal jurisdiction was not met, the Court dismissed the complaint.

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