Bank Held a Valid Security Interest in Debtor's Collateral and Thereby Qualified for a Contemporaneous Exchange of New Value Exception Under 547(c)(1) and Repayment on Loan was not a Fraudulent Conveyance Under 548

In re: J. Silver Clothing, Inc., Chapter 7, Case No. 05-10522 (PJW); Burtch v. Connecticut Community Bank, N.A. d/b/a The Greenwich Bank, Adv. Pro. No. 07-50814 (KG) (April 29, 2011) (J. Gross)

Summary:

The Chapter 7 Trustee (the “Trustee”) filed a Complaint seeking, inter alia, to avoid Debtor’s transfer of a security interest in substantially all of its assets to Connecticut Community Bank, N.A. d/b/a The Greenwich Bank & Trust Company (the “Bank”), which occurred with the preference period. The Court was first asked to determine whether the transfer met the requirements of section 547(c)(1). The Court determined that the transfer met both of the requirements of the subsection as the transfer was intended by the debtor and the creditor to be a contemporaneous exchange and was, in fact, a contemporaneous exchange.

Discussion:

The during the fall of 2004, the Debtor entered into a revolving credit loan in an amount that would not exceed $1 million (the “Loan”). The Loan closed on December 1, 2004. Debtor entered into a Loan and Security Agreement (the “Loan Agreement”) with the Bank and Debtor executed a Credit Agreement and Commercial Revolving Loan Note (the “Note”). The Bank required a first lien on all of Debtor’s business assets, excluding real estate. The Bank also required a guarantee from co-defendant James Fuld (“Fuld”). The guarantee provided a more timely closing, a lower interest rate and more favorable repayment terms.

The Bank’s first lien covered substantially all of the Debtor’s assets. To ensure its first lien position, the Bank caused Debtor to file UCC-3’s cancelling prior recorded security interests in Debtor’s assets and certificate that no liens existed in Delaware. The Bank also required Fuld to subordinate his notes. However, problems ensued when the Bank attempted to perfect its security interest in the Collateral. Bank’s counsel mailed its UCC-1 to the Delaware Division of Corporations on December 3, 2004, one day after the Bank made its first distribution under the Loan. The Division of Corporations rejected the First UCC-1 and on December 20, 2004, counsel mailed a second, corrected UCC-1. The Debtor filed its own UCC-1 on December 30, 2004. The Bank’s Second UCC-1 was filed on January 4, 2005. 

Thereafter, in mid-January 2005, the Debtor sold 29 stores for $1.4 million to Hoffman Acquisition Corp. (“Hoffman”). Hoffman required the Bank to release its lien on the Debtor’s assets. The sale closed on February 16, 2005 and as required by the Loan Agreement, Hoffman, on Debtor’s behalf, paid the Bank $485,569.95 (the “Repayment”) which the Debtor owed, thereby enabling the Bank to release its lien. Debtor then filed its petition under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code on February 25, 2005. The case was subsequently converted to a chapter 7. The Trustee’s claims arise from the Loan and the Repayment.

The Court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The Court found that the Debtor’s transfer of the security interest in the Collateral to the Bank was intended by the parties as a contemporaneous exchange for the Bank’s $1 million credit loan to Debtor (under section 547(c)(1)(A)) and was in fact, substantially contemporaneous (under section 547(c)(1)(B)). First, the Court determined that the documents underlying the Loan supported a finding that the parties intended for the exchange to be contemporaneous. Not only did the Bank offer evidence that the Loan was contemplated only with a first priority lien on the Collateral and Fuld’s Guarantee, the Defendants also provided direct evidence that the Debtor intended and took action to provide the Bank with a first lien on the Collateral. The Debtor was required to file a UCC-3 and also filed a UCC-1.

Next, under section 547(c)(B), the Court refused to adopt a bright-line rule in interpreting section 547(e). The Court concluded that Section 547(e) does not inform the “substantially contemporaneous” requirement of section 547(c). Rather, the Court noted that the modifier “substantial” makes it clear that contemporaneity is a flexible concept which requires a case-by-case inquiry into all relevant circumstances. The Court looked to the totality of the circumstances, including reasons for the delay, the intent of the parties, and the possibility of fraud.

The Court also dismissed the remaining causes of action, including these alleging a fraudulent transfer. The Court concluded that the Bank had a valid, perfected security interest and was over secured. Therefore, there was no question that the Debtor received reasonably equivalent value for the repayment on the Loan. 

Motion to Dismiss Granted as to Preferential Transfer Claims, Fraudulent Transfer Claims, Aiding and Abetting Claims Against Individual Director, Disallowance of Claims, and Claims for Recharacterization and Disgorgement

Burtch v. Huston (In re USDigital, Inc.), Case No. 09-10374 (CSS), Adv. Pro. No. 09-50469 (CSS) (January 5, 2011) (J. Sontchi)

On March 26, 2007 (the “Petition Date”), USDigital filed a voluntary Chapter 7 petition, subsequent to which Jeoffrey L. Burtch was appointed as successor interim Chapter 7 Trustee (the “Trustee”). The Trustee filed a complaint on March 18, 2009 seeking to avoid prepetition transfers and alleging breaches of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duty, usurping corporate opportunity, corporate waste, unjust enrichment, accounting, disallowance of claims, equitable subordination, and recharacterization against NexGen Telecom, LLC (“NexGen”), Infinidi Media, Inc. (“Infinidi Media”), Stonebridge Marketing, LLC (“Stonebridge”), and directors of USDigital, Inc. (collectively, the “Defendants”).

On November 12, 2009, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, to which the Trustee objected on January 14, 2010. The Defendants filed a reply brief on February 12, 2010 and the Court entered its order and issued its opinion on January 5, 2011.

By way of background, USDigital was one of four separate, but interconnected, corporations formed between 2003 and 2006. The corporate quartet consisted of: (1) USDigital; (2) USDigital Television, LLC (“USDTV”); (3) NexGen; and (4) Infinidi Media. Each of these corporations shared the same source of capital, had many of the same directors and officers, and entered into transactions with one another. In relevant part, on June 13, 2006, USDTV executed a promissory note in favor of NexGen in the amount of $104,160.00 secured by set top boxes owned by USDTV, which transaction was documented by a security agreement (the “USDTV Security Agreement”). 

Following USDTV’s bankruptcy petition in 2007, USDigital and USDTV entered into an asset purchase agreement (the “APA”) for the sale of substantially all of USDTV’s assets to USDigital, as well as USDigital’s assumption of USDTV’s liabilities to NexGen including the USDTV Security Agreement, which sale was approved on September 12, 2006.

Discussion:

The Court’s ruling and rationale concerning each of the counts of the complaint are set forth below.

Count I: Preferential Transfers to NexGen

Count I of the Complaint alleged that USDigital made two preferential transfers to NexGen: (i) a security interest in the set top boxes, and (ii) a $44,421 payment for expense reimbursement for a payment NexGen made to ESPN on USDTV’s behalf. The issue with respect to both transfers was whether the payment was made “for or on account of an antecedent debt,” as required by 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(2). The Court determined that neither payment was made on account of an antecedent debt because: (i) the transfer of the security interest occurred on the same day as USDigital incurred the obligation to make such transfer, both of which events either occurred on the date USDigital entered into the APA or on the date the Court approved the asset sale; and (ii) the expense reimbursement payment was made on August 8, 2006, comfortably before the Debtor became obligated to make such payment pursuant to the September 12, 2006 approval of the APA. Accordingly, Count I was dismissed.

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Summary Judgment Denied On 547(c)(2) Ordinary Course Defense, But Fraudulent Conveyance Claims Dismissed With Leave To Amend

Wahoski v. Classic Packaging Co. (In re Pillowtex Corp.), Adv. Pro. No. 05-30182 (KJC) (April 14, 2010) (J. Carey)

John Wahoski, as liquidating trustee of Pillowtex Corporation (the “Liquidating Trustee”) sought to recover $61,761.32 in allegedly preferential payments (the “Transfers”) from Classic Packaging Company (“Classic”), which had sold plastic bags and packaging printed with the Pillowtex brand names to the Debtors prior to the petition date.  The Liquidating Trustee was also pursuing a claim to recover allegedly fraudulent transfers. 

Classic filed a motion for summary judgment with regard to the Transfers, arguing that the ordinary course of business defense applied to each Transfer and a motion to dismiss arguing that the complaint did not set forth fraudulent transfer claims with sufficient specificity.  For the reasons articulated below, the Court denied the motion for summary judgment and granted the motion to dismiss.

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Court Grants Motion to Dismiss Amended Avoidance Complaint, But Grants Plaintiff Leave to Amend

MAS Litigation Trust v. Plastech Engineered Prods. (In re Meridian Automotive Sys.-Composite Ops. Inc.), Adv. Pro. No. 07-51196 (KG), 2007 WL 4322527 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 5, 2007) (Judge Kevin Gross)

Plastech Engineered Products, Inc., a defendant in an avoidance action commenced by the MAS Litigation Trust, moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s amended complaint on the grounds that, inter alia, the new claims set forth in the amended complaint did not relate back to the original complaint.  In a matter related to one we discussed here last week, The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware granted the motion, finding that the new claims did not seem to arise out of the same transactions described in the original complaint.  However, the Court granted the plaintiff twenty days to amend the complaint, if it could allege facts sufficient to show the additional claims related back to the original ones.

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District Court Grants Defendants' Motion to Strike Damages Claims, Finding Plaintiff Did Not Give Notice of Grounds Upon Which Claims Rested

Stanziale v. Pepper Hamilton LLP (In re Student Finance Corp.), No. 04-1551 (JJF), 2007 WL 2936195 (D. Del. Oct. 5, 2007) (Judge Joseph J. Farnan, Jr.)

In this adversary proceeding in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, certain defendants moved to strike damages claims alleged by the trustee of the estate of Student Finance Corporation.  The Court granted the motion, finding that the trustee failed to provide fair notice of these damages claims, as required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (made applicable to this adversary proceeding by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7008(a)). 

 

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Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute Denied; Bankruptcy Court Holds Five Year Period of Inactivity by Plaintiff Insufficient to Justify Sanction of Dismissal

Fruehauf Trailer Corp. v. Nat. Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA (In re Fruehauf Trailer Corp.), Case Nos. 96-1563–1572, Adv. Pro. No. 98-514, 2007 WL 676248 (Bankr. D. Del. March 2, 2007) (Judge Peter J. Walsh)

The defendants filed this motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), after a period of inactivity in the instant adversary proceeding of more than five years. The court denied the motion, finding that the plaintiff asserted cognizable claims, and that the most drastic sanction of dismissal was inappropriate. The Court held that giving the defendants the benefit of the doubt in all issues of fact that became vague as a result of the passage of time was sufficient to counter-balance the prejudice to defendants caused by the delay. In addition, the Court found that it was obliged to refer the matter to arbitration, pursuant to the agreement between the debtor and the defendants.

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Party That Received Checks From Debtor, But Did Not Have Right To Payment, Who Then Forwarded Checks To Party With Right To Payment From Debtor, Held Not To Be "Transferee" For Purposes Of Preference Complaint

Broadway Advisors, LLC v. Hipro Elecs., Inc. (In re Gruppo Antico, Inc.), 359 B.R. 578 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007) (Judge Kevin J. Carey)

Vendor Hipro Electronics, Ltd. of Taiwan sold computer parts to the debtor prior to the commencement of the debtor’s bankruptcy case. However, in the period running up to the petition date, the debtor sent payments for Hipro Taiwan invoices to another Hipro entity, Hipro Electronics, Inc., in Texas. Hipro USA forwarded those checks to Hipro Taiwan, who deposited the checks into their own account. The debtor, however, commenced a preference action against Hipro USA. Hipro USA filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court held that, because Hipro USA never deposited the funds, it was not a transferee of the debtor, and therefore could not be liable for the avoidance of the payments that the debtor sent to Hipro USA.

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Transfer of Funds By Debtor To Rightful Owner Did Not Create Preference Liability Under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) Where Debtor Acquired Funds By Conversion

Claybrook v. Consolidated Foods, Inc. (In re Bake-Line Group, LLC), 359 B.R. 566 (Bankr D. Del. Feb. 5, 2007) (Judge Peter J. Walsh)

The debtor came into possession of a check made payable to the preference defendant when the postman mistakenly delivered the check to the debtor. The debtor converted the check, depositing it into the debtor’s bank account. The defendant learned of the debtor’s actions, and demanded and received from the debtor a check to cover the funds that the debtor had converted. Days later, the debtor commenced its bankruptcy case.

The plaintiff in this adversary proceeding, the trustee of the debtor’s estate, sued the defendant to recover the payment as a preferential transfer. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, finding that the debtor converted the funds, and never had any interest in them that it could transfer.

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New Value Must Remain Unpaid? It's Time to Resole New York City Shoes

New Value Must Remain Unpaid?  It's Time to Resole New York City Shoes.  ABI Journal, Vol. XXV, No. 9, November 2006.  Co-authored by: Carl N. Kunz, III.

 

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Partial Summary Judgment Was Appropriate Where Chapter 7 Trustee Filed Preference And Fraudulent Transfer Claims After Statute Of Limitations Ran, And Where Trustee Merely Recited Fraudulent Transfer Statute, But Alleged No Facts In Support Of Claims

Burtch v. Dent, (In re Circle Y of Yoakum, Tx.), 354 B.R. 349 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (Judge Mary F. Walrath)

The Chapter 7 Trustee of debtor Circle Y’s estate asserted claims under sections 547 and 548 of the Bankruptcy Code relating to payments made to an insider more than one year before the petition date. The Bankruptcy Court held that those claims were time-barred. Also, because the Trustee’s fraudulent transfer claims pled no facts in support of the Trustee’s allegations, but merely recited relevant statutory language, the Bankruptcy Court dismissed those claims for failure to plead fraud with sufficient particularity. However, the Court granted the Chapter 7 Trustee leave to amend to add additional payments where those payments were part of a discernible pattern with payments alleged in the Trustee’s original complaint.

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Sale Order Does Not Protect A Non-Debtor Subsidiary Sold During Bankruptcy From Preference Action

Amphenol Corp. v. Shandler (In re Insilco Techs., Inc.) 351 B.R. 313 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (Judge Kevin J. Carey)

Amphenol challenged the filing of a preference action against PCM, a non-debtor subsidiary it had purchased from the debtor, because the order approving the sale did so free of all liens and encumbrances. The Court interpreted the sale agreement and order as releasing Amphenol from the estate’s claims related to the purchase and ownership of PCM’s stock, but not releasing PCM itself from any estate actions, as PCM was a distinct corporate entity from Amphenol.

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Employee Payroll Deductions For Health Benefits Do Not Constitute Preferential Transfers When Paid Into A Health Plan

Golden v. The Guardian (In re Lenox Healthcare, Inc.), 343 B.R. 96 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (Judge Mary F. Walrath)

 

When Guardian Life Insurance Company of America was sued by the Chapter 11 Trustee for Lenox Healthcare, Inc. for alleged preferential, fraudulent and unauthorized post-petition transfers it received, Guardian moved for summary judgment in part on the basis that the transfers it received were actually deductions taken by Lenox from its employees’ paychecks for the purpose of procuring health benefits. As a result, Guardian argued, the funds received by it were not transfers of the debtor’s interest in property, and therefore were not recoverable as preferences. The Bankruptcy Court (Judge Mary F. Walrath) agreed.

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Letters Asking Debtor To Comply With Trade Terms Does Not Invalidate Ordinary Course Defense, But Change In Credit Terms To Payment In Advance Takes Payments Out Of The § 547(c)(2) Safe Harbor

In re Hayes Lemmerz Int'l, Inc. (HLI Creditor Trust v. Metal Techs., Inc., 337 B.R. 49 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (Judge Paul B. Lindsey)

The Court presided over a trial in which only the defendant’s § 547(c)(2)(B) and (C) ordinary course of business defenses were at issue.

The Court found that the payments had been made pursuant to ordinary business terms in the defendant’s industry under pre-BAPCPA §547(c)(2)(C) and read the acceptable range of payment aging broadly.

The Court further found that a creditor who insists on a debtor remaining within credit terms established by the parties can do so without taking subsequent payments out of the ordinary course of business under §547 (c)(2)(B). However, if credit terms are altered, such as when shipment is conditioned on advance payment, the ordinary course defense is defeated.

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Delaware Bankruptcy Court Holds That New Value Need Not Remain Unpaid For Preference Defendant To Prove Subsequent New Value Defense

Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del. v. Universal Forest Products, Inc. (In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del., Inc.), Case No. 99-02261 (PJW), Adv. Pro. No, 01-3170 (PBL), 2004 WL 3113718 (Bankr. D. Del. December 14, 2004) (Judge Paul B. Lindsey)

The debtor, Hechinger Investment Company, operated a chain of home improvement stores. Defendant Universal Forest Products was a trade creditor of the debtor, supplying treated wood products for sale at the debtor’s stores. The debtor brought a preference action against UFP. UFP filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting various defenses under 11 U.S.C. § 547(c), including, most notably, a subsequent new value defense under section 547(c)(4). The Court distinguished the Third Circuit case of In re New York City Shoes, Inc., 880 F.2d 679 (3d Cir.1989), holding that in a typical running account scenario like this one, there is no requirement in section 547(c) that new value remain unpaid. However, the Court held that summary judgment was premature absent a waiver of the other asserted defenses under section 547(c), or a stipulation by the parties as to the amount in controversy, because a calculation under section 547(c)(4) must be prefaced by a determination of whether the transfers made on account of new value are "otherwise avoidable."

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